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IN RE BLODGETT
112 S. Ct. 674 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS

HOLDING

In 1982, a Washingtonjury convicted Charles Rodman Campbell of
multiple murders and sentenced him to death. Direct appeals, t a state
habeas petition, and a federal habeas petition2 all failed to provide any
relief to Campbell. After Campbell filed a second federal habeas petition
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
in 1989, the district court held a hearing and issued a written opinion
denying a stay or other relief to the defendant.
On March 28, 1989, Campbell appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals subsequently
granted an indefinite stay of execution and set a briefing schedule. The
case was argued in June 1989, but no decision was forthcoming. The stay
of execution remained in effect.
As a result of the delay, the Attorney General of Washington sent
letters to the Court of Appeals panel in both April and October of 1990
requesting a status report on the case. Neither letter was answered.
In July 1990, Campbell filed a third action for collateral relief in the
form of a personal restraint petition in state court. On March 21, 1991,
the Washington Supreme Court denied Campbell's petition on its merits.
At this point, Campbell stated that he desired to discharge his
attorney and proceed pro se and stated that he would file a third federal
habeas petition in the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals. Two months later,
the Court of Appeals panel granted the discharge motion to relieve
counsel, directed Campbell to file his third habeas petition by August 30,
and announced that it intended to wait for the district court's ruling before
3
taking further action.
As a result of the delays, the Washington Attorney General filed a
mandamus petition with the United States Supreme Court that would
have required the Court of Appeals to consider Blodgett's appeal from
denial of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court of
Appeals filed a response giving no apparent reason for the panel's delay
in the deciding the case, but did state that the delay occurred, in part,
because the Ninth Circuit had not wanted to make a decision on the
appeal until the state court handed down its decision. The appeals court
reasoned that if the Washington court had granted the state petition for
relief, the federal case would have become moot. The response also
stated that the court wished to avoid piecemeal appeals by waiting for the
district court's decision on the third federal habeas petition. Finally, the
responding appeals panel noted that the Ninth Circuit had formed a Death
Penalty Task Force in order to eliminate successive habeas petitions and
that the consolidation of the last two petitions was consistent with the
goals of the task force.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the State of
Washington was entitled to a writ of mandamus that would force the
Court of Appeals to immediately consider Blodgett's second habeas
corpus appeal.

The Supreme Court denied the state's mandamus request. 4 The
Court held that the state should have asked the Court of Appeals to vacate
or modify its 1991 order before proceeding to the United States Supreme
Court with its request.5 However, the Court in Blodgett took a strong
position on stays of executions and "explicitly" held that "[ifn a capital
case the grant of a stay of execution directed to a State by a federal court
imposes on that court the concomitant duty to take all steps necessary to
ensure a prompt resolution of the matter, consistent with its duty to give
'6
full and fair consideration to all of the issues presented in the case."
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Campbell v. Washington, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
Campbell v. Kincheloe, 488 U.S. 948 (1988).
Campbell v. Blodgett, 940 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991).
In reBlodgett, 112 S.Ct. 674, 677 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 676.

Id.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Blodgett decision sends a clear message that the Supreme Court
is becoming increasingly impatient with habeas delays. The opinion's
strong language suggests that the Court is growing weary of lower courts
that allow protracted collateral proceedings in death penalty cases and
will no longer tolerate long or indiscriminate stays of execution.
The Court stated that "none of the reasons offered in the response
[from the Court of Appeals] dispels our concern that the State of
Washington has sustained severe prejudice by the two-and-a-half-year
stay of execution." 7 In addition, the Court held that the "stay has
prevented Washington from exercising its sovereign power to enforce
the criminal law, an interest we found of great weight in McCleskey v.
Zant when discussing the importance of finality in the context of federal
8
habeas corpus proceedings."
Finally, upon denying the State's mandamus relief, the Supreme
Court issued the Court of Appeals a clear and indisputable warning: "In
view of the delay that has already occurred any further postponements or
extensions of time will be subject to a most rigorous scrutiny in this
Court if the State of Washington files a further meritorious petition for
relief."9 While the warning language in Blodgett is, in fact, dicta and
specific to Blodgett's case, itundeniably communicates thatthe Supreme
Court will no longer tolerate extended collateral proceedings.
An exclamation point was added to the Supreme Court's message
of impatience in several recent cases. In Madden v. Texas, 10 Justice
Scalia issued a chilling warning that there will be few extensions to the
90-day time limit for certiorari review. In his opinion he stated that "[a]ll
of these are capital cases. That class ofcase has not, however, been made
a generic exception to the 90-day time limit... ."I He further asserted
that "[tihere is even greater need to reject such an automatic rule [of
extension] in capital cases than there is elsewhere, since no lawyer should
be burdened with the knowledge that, if he were only to withdraw from
the case, his client's appeal could be lengthened and the execution of
' 12
sentence, in all likelihood, deferred.
Similarly, the court in Vasquez v. Harris13 issued an unprecedented

8 Id. (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991)). See case
summary of McKleskey, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.4, No.l,p.7 (1991).
9 Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
10 111 S.Ct. 902, 905 (1991).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 112 S.Ct. 1713 (1992).
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two sentence opinion ordering that the current stay of execution entered
by the United States Court of Appeals in that case be vacated. The final
sentence of the decision simply states that, "[n]o further stays of Robert
Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts except upon
order of this Court." 14 This decision, again, reflects the growing
impatience of the Court. It is becoming more and more apparent that the
United States Supreme Court is no longer going to tolerate extensive and
lengthy appeals in capital cases.
Although these opinions are directed more toward the courts than
attorneys, it is important to bear in mind the increasing lack of patience
that the current Supreme Court is exhibiting. 15 The new "tone" of the
Supreme Court regarding the granting of stays has the potential to

drastically increase the execution rate in Virginia. Attorneys must not
depend on last-minute stays of execution nor count on cases drifting
through the circuit courts for extended periods of time. Instead, attorneys
must aggressively pursue all potential claims at every step of the process
and ensure that they are fully presented. There will be few, if any, second
chances.

14 Id. The stay being vacated was the last in a series of stays given
by the Ninth Circuit during the night leading up to Harris' execution the
next morning.
15 The United States Court of Appeals for Fourth Circuit has

demonstrated similar impatience in the area of administrative delays.
See Spann v. Martin,963 F.2d 663 (1992). See case summary of Spann,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue.

Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James

WILLIAMS v. DIXON
961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Douglas Williams, Jr. was arrested on August 2, 1981 and charged
with the murder of one-hundred year old Adah Hemdon Dawson. Under
the influence of drugs and alcohol, Williams had entered the Dawson
home looking for a place to sleep. When Dawson surprised him in the
kitchen, Williams struck her with a stick he had picked up on the porch.
He laid her on the floor and proceeded to ransack the house. He then
returned to the kitchen and forced a mop handle into Dawson's vagina.
During the guilt phase of the trial, the medical examiner testified
that Dawson suffered numerous lacerations to her head, neck, arms,
vagina and rectum, together with fractures of the face, skull, pubic bone
and hip bone. The medical examiner further testified that Dawson died
as a result of the multiple injuries.
Williams offered no evidence at the guilt phase of trial. The jury
found him guilty under North Carolina law of first degree murder in the
perpetration of first degree burglary, in the perpetration of a sex offense,
and with malice, premeditation and deliberation.
At the sentencing phase, the state relied upon the evidence presented at the guilt phase, as well as a written psychological report finding
that Williams did not suffer any mental defect or disorder which would
have prevented him from distinguishing right from wrong at the time of
thekilling. Thereport furtherconcluded thatintoxication would not have
relieved Williams of responsibility for the crime. Williams introduced
evidence of his past criminal record, as well as evidence that he was
mildly retarded, with poor reading skills and possible organic brain
impairment.
Based upon the evidence presented during the sentencing phase, the
jury was presented with four possible aggravating factors and five
I State v. Williams, 301 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1983).
2 Williams v. North Carolina,464 U.S. 865 (1983), reh'g denied,
464 U.S. 1004 (1983).
3 Williams also argued that (1) the constitution prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty upon a mildly retarded defendant; (2) he
received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict. These issues will not be addressed in
this summary.

possible mitigating factors. Thejury was instructed that it could consider
the mitigating factors only if they unanimously agreed to do so. After
the sentencing phase, the jury returned a recommendation for a sentence
of death, and the judge sentenced Williams to death.
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld Williams' conviction on
appeal.1 The United States Supreme Court denied both certiorari and a
request for rehearing. 2 In May 1984, Williams filed a state habeas
petition. The state court denied the request in June, 1985, and the North
Carolina Supreme Court denied review. On October 13, 1987, Williams
filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The judge denied the
petition without a hearing.
Williams appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing,
among other issues, that the sentencing instruction requiring unanimity
3
for considering mitigating factors was unconstitutional.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Williams' conviction for first degree
murder.4 However, relying upon the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in McKoy v. North Carolina,5 the court found that "the unanimity
requirement [regarding mitigating circumstances] given to the jury at
Williams' sentencing proceedings... was unconstitutional. ' 6 Because
the court further found that Williams' claim was not barred by the
Supreme Court's general ban on retroactive application of new rules to
habeas corpus claims in Teague v. Lane7 , the court vacated Williams'
sentence and remanded the case to the district court. 8
The Fourth Circuit also established a second, independent reason
for vacating Williams' death sentence. Concluding that "Teague's
4 Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992).
5 494 U.S. 433 (1990). In McKoy, the court struck down a jury
instruction requiring unanimity for considering mitigating circumstances
during penalty phase deliberations as unconstitutional.
Williams, 961 F.2d at 452.
7 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
8 Williams, 961 F.2d at 450.

